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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals of 
final agency orders pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and § 
78-2a-3(2) (j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Was the Utah State Tax Commission correct in 
affirming and sustaining the audit assessment for sales and use 
tax of tangible personal property Petitioner used or consumed in 
constructing a real property facility as prime contractor? 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact and 
law. The standard of review is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-
1-610(1) (Supp. 1994). The Court must grant the Tax Commission 
"deference concerning its written findings of factr applying a 
substantial evidence standard on review." The Court grants no 
deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Was the Tax Commission correct in disregarding 
a paragraph in the Joint Stipulation of Facts, when the weight of 
the evidence contradicted it? 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact and 
law. The standard of review is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-
1-610 (1) (Supp. 1994). The Court must grant the Tax Commission 
"deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a 
substantial evidence standard on review." The Court grants no 
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deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1989). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107 (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(e)(ii) (Supp. 1996). 
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-58 (Supp. 1996) 
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-2 (Supp. 1996) 
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-23.E. (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Yeargin filed an appeal in the Tax Commission for 
reconsideration of an audit for sales and use tax. A formal 
hearing was held on March 13, 1997. The Commission issued its 
Final Division in affirming and sustaining the audit on April 14, 
1997. 
On May 7, 1997, Yeargin filed a Complaint and Petition for 
Review by Trial De Novo of Final Decision of State Tax Commission 
in the Third District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
601(1996). 
On October 30, 1997, Yeargin filed a Motion to Remand to Tax 
Commission in the Third District Court in an effort to transfer 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Petitioner, Yeargin, In, Yeargii '" was the contractor 
1
 W 
manufacturing iaci-it. :;.r ammonium perchlorate 'r " r* . 
This faciii* • was bei: - constructed near Ceda: 
County, n<-- D ** c Ammonium perchlorate ^s ubtu 
make fu^ c "' y sol-in ^ei rockets, important to space 
2. Following an explosion of i : ior ammonium perchlorate 
I r- . • . 
new facility needea tc ce constructed lr. at tc-cd). 
3. Tne pieviuub pruuu 
named Pacific Engineering emu Production ^u. o: Nevada 
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("PEPCON") (R. at 88). Western Electrochemical Company 
("WECCO") is a wholly owned subsidiary of PEPCON which owns 
the ammonium perchlorate facility in Iron County (Tr. at 66-
67). The Agreement establishing the responsibilities of 
Yeargin identifies the work to be done by the contractor as: 
Contractor shall perform, as necessary for completion 
of the Project, the detailed design and engineering 
(including preparation of plans, specifications, 
construction drawings and estimates); shall, procure, 
deliver and install permanent materials and, equipment; 
shall procure and deliver construction equipment, 
supplies, tools; shall provide supervisory services and 
labor; and shall perform changes, if any, pursuant to 
GC-3; all in accordance with the terms of this 
Agreement (the Work). 
at 21, 163) . 
In approximately May 1991, the Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission conducted an audit of Yeargin (Tr. at 
81, 83). Documents reviewed by an auditor included purchase 
orders, purchase order status reports, checks, ledgers, and 
sales tax returns (Tr. at 82, 85-85, 89-90, 91, 101-103). 
After reviewing and analyzing these documents, the Auditing 
Division issued a Statutory Notice with an accompanying Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Audit Summary dated September 17, 1992 (R. 
100-133). The Audit Summary listed itemized transactions 
which the Auditing Division determined as taxable. The 
total tax due was $67,827.86 (R. at 102). Ron Jacobsen, 
Senior Auditor with the Auditing Division, reviewed each 
document itemized on the schedules accompanying the Audit 
4 
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9. Yeargin acknowledged it had taxable purchases by filing Utah 
State Quarterly Sales and Use Tax returns from October 1988 
through December 1989 (R. at 135-142), (Tr. at 93-94). All 
of the purchases scheduled in the Audit Summary traced the 
accrual records of Yeargin to invoices or other supporting 
documentation and were scheduled only for the Cedar City 
facility (Tr. at 95, 97). All purchase orders and checks 
reviewed as supporting documents to the scheduled items in 
the Audit Summary belonged to Yeargin (Tr. at 98, .111, R. at 
143, 204-211, 213-217, 219-221). 
10. Following the formal hearing, the Tax Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, 
attached as Addendum A. The Findings of Fact included: 
a. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
b. The period in question is October 1988 through December 
1989. 
c. During the course of construction of the facility, PPI 
and WECCO entered into an agreement with United 
Engineers and Constructors, Inc., and its affiliate, 
Yeargin, for purpose of providing assistance in the 
engineering, design and procurement for the 
construction of the AP manufacturing facility. United 
Engineers assisted WECCO in purchasing materials for 
use in the construction of the facility and located 
6 
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pr 
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been a party to the contract, the actions of Petitioner 
determine the taxability of purchases, and not the 
written agreement, especially if the provisions of the 
agreement were not followed. 
Notwithstanding paragraph GC-17 of the Agreement, 
paragraph A-l of the Agreement provides the contractor 
(United or Yeargin) is to "procure, deliver and install 
permanent materials and equipment." The evidence 
submitted in this proceeding is clear that Petitioner 
did procure many of the materials and install them into 
the project. 
Yeargin also issued an exemption certificate to the 
vendors of some of the materials. Exemption 
certificates were not appropriately issued for any 
materials which were not resold or which Petitioner 
installed into real property. 
There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that WECCO 
or any other company paid the sales tax on the 
materials at issue in this proceeding. 
The only items on which sales tax has been imposed upon 
Petitioner by Respondent are those materials which were 
invoiced to Petitioner and/or were paid for by checks 
of Petitioner. 
In performing the audit, Respondent looked only at who 
8 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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Substantial evidence exists in the record to justify the 
factual findings of the Commission that Yeargin consumed and was 
liable for those purchases. Contractual provisions, and the 
weight of the evidence defends the Commission's decision, and 
even if the parties are bound to a joint stipulation of facts, 
the Commission had the power to set that aside in the face of 
justifiable cause and contrary evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT MUST GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE TAX COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUDING THAT YEARGIN, INC., AS A 
REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR, VENDOR, OR USER, WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING AND REMITTING SALES OR USE 
TAX ON ALL TRANSACTIONS IN THE AUDIT. 
Petitioner was a real property contractor for the 
construction of the WECCO facility (the "Work" or "the Project" 
as Referenced in the Transcript and Pleadings). Items of 
tangible personal property purchased by the Petitioner, which 
were included on Schedule 1 of the Audit Summary, were converted 
to real property by the Petitioner (R. at 9, 21, 105-108, 163), 
(T. at 31, 85-89, 91-92). 
The Tax Commission found that "[i]n addition to assisting 
WECCO, United Engineers and Yeargin actually purchased some of 
the materials which were invoiced and billed to Yeargin and were 
paid for by checks from Yeargin. Yeargin ultimately installed 
those materials into the real property of the WECCO facility or 
consumed the materials in the construction process." (R. at 9). 
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The sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 and Utah 
Code Admin. P. R865-19S-58 (Supp. 1996) . Utah law imposes a tax 
against the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for tangible 
personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1989). The administrative rules of the 
Tax Commission generally provide that the person who converts the 
personal property into real property is the consumer of the 
personal property, since that person is the last one to* own it as 
personal property. Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-58 (Supp. 1996). 
As the installation contractor, Petitioner by law became the 
ultimate consumer of the tangible personal property and is 
therefore subject to the sales and use tax on the materials in 
those transactions. 
In Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar claim by 
a taxpayer who sought an exemption from sales tax on items that 
were sold to out-of-state customers. Tummurru was in the 
business of constructing and selling modular buildings. The 
company made a number of sales to out-of-state customers, 
transported the modular units to the site, and then Tummurru's 
construction arm installed the buildings on-site. In holding the 
taxpayer liable for the sales taxes on the transactions, the Utah 
Supreme Court applied a principal first discussed in Utah 
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Concrete Products Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 125 P.2d 402 
(Utah 1942), and supported by later decisions, that contractors 
are the ultimate consumers of the items they purchase for 
incorporation into real property. E.C. Olsen Co. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 168 P.2d 324 (Utah 1946), BJ-Titan Services v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992). 
Paragraph A-l of the Agreement between WECCO and Petitioner 
defines the work to be done by Petitioner: 
Contractor shall perform, as necessary for completion 
of the project, the detailed design and engineering 
(including preparation of plans, specifications, 
construction drawings, and estimates); shall procure, 
deliver and install permanent materials and eouipment; 
shall procure and deliver construction equipment, 
supplies, tools; shall provide supervisory services and 
labor; and shall perform changes, if any, pursuant to 
GC-3; all in accordance with the terms of this 
Agreement (the Work). (Emphasis added.) 
Petitioner was a real property contractor, and as such made 
purchases of all items included in the Audit Summary. The Record 
supports, and the Tax Commission found that Petitioner was the 
purchaser or user of those materials in Schedule 1 of the Audit 
Summary as an ultimate consumer, by installing those materials 
into real property at the WECCO facility, or, having consumed 
items of tangible personal property (Schedule 2 of the Audit 
Summary). Sub-argument "A" below explains this reasoning, which 
should be adopted. But even if the Court rejects it, Sub-
arguments "B" and "C" demonstrate how Petitioner will still be 
12 
liable for sales or use tax on all transactions in the audit. 
The Tax Commission's Findings of Fact were Based 
on Substantial Evidence and the Failure of the 
Petitioner to Marshal Evidence to the Contrary 
Requires this Court to Sustain the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision. 
The Tax Commission in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Lawf and Final Decision, attached hereto as Addendum A, found: 
a. The evidence submitted in this proceeding is clear that 
the Petitioner did procure many of the materials and 
install them into the project. (R. at 10-11). 
b. "Yeargin... issued an exemption certificate to the 
vendors of some of the materials. Exemption 
certificates were not appropriately issued for any 
materials which were not resold or which Petitioner 
installed into real property." (R. at 11). 
c. "There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that 
WECCO or any other company paid the sales tax on the 
materials at issue in this proceeding." (R. at 11). 
d. "The only items on which sales tax has been imposed 
upon Petitioner by Respondent are those materials which 
were invoiced to Petitioner and/or were paid for by 
checks of Petitioner." (R. at 11). 
e. "Petitioner converted the materials to real property, 
or personally consumed the materials in the 
construction of the project." (R. at 11). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1996) establishes the 
standard of review of an appellate court: 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals 
or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the Commission deference concerning its 
written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence stands on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning 
its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court. 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Under the "substantial evidence" test, the reviewing court 
shall "grant the commission deference concerning its written 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard." 
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion. First National Bank of Boston v. County 
Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P. 2d 1163 (Utah 
1992). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere ^scintilla' of 
evidence . . . though ^something less than the weight of the 
evidence.'" (Citations omitted). Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989). 
The "substantial evidence" test requires review of the whole 
record, including evidence that both supports the agency's 
factual findings and evidence that fairly detracts from the 
14 
weight of the evidence. Id. at 68. This does not mean that the 
Commission need grant equal weight to all the evidence. Ouestar 
Pipeline Company v. Utah State Tax Commfn, 850 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
1993). In the past, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
"substantial evidence" test "requires us to uphold an agency's 
factual findings if such findings are supported by substantial 
evidence." Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 
(Utah 1992) . 
The burden of proof lies with the party appealing the 
administrative order. Id. at 852. The challenging party must 
"marshal all of the evidence supporting findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts and in light of the conflicting 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. This 
Court has held that: 
Successful challenges to findings of fact thus must 
demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial 
court found the facts from the evidence and second why 
such findings contradict the weight of the evidence. 
Oneida/SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053 .(Utah App. 1994). In describing the responsibility of 
the challenger this Court noted: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling 
the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw 
15 
in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. (Emphasis added.) 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991). The Petitioner has failed to marshal the 
evidence in accordance with these decisions. The Findings of 
Fact by the Tax Commission in it's Final Decision, even if not 
sufficiently marshaled by the Petitioner in it's brief, easily 
meets the substantial evidence standard (See Addendum A). Thus, 
the Tax Commission correctly concludes, "Therefore, it appears 
clear to the Commission that Yeargin purchased the materials and 
installed those materials into the real property at the Cedar 
City facility or otherwise consumed those materials or supplies 
in the construction of that project. Under either event, sales 
and use tax would be due and owing from the Petitioner." (R. at 
15.) 
B. Irrespective of Petitioner's Contract or Agency 
Arguments, Petitioner was Responsible to Collect 
and Pay Sales or Use Tax on the Audited Non-Exempt 
Transactions as a Vendor or Consumer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) provides: 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount 
paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state... (emphasis added). 
As established previously, the Petitioner purchased all items 
reflected on the schedules accompanying the Audit Summary (Tr. at 
88, 101-104, 109-112), (R. at 143-144, 211-221). Sales tax is a 
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transactional tax. Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-2 (Supp. 1996) 
states: 
A. The sales and use taxes are transactional taxes 
imposed on certain retail sales and leases of tangible 
personal property.... B. The tax is not upon the 
articles sold or furnished, but upon the transaction, 
and the purchaser is the actual taxpayer. The vendor is 
charged with the duty of collecting the tax from the 
purchaser and of paying the tax to the state. 
This is the foundation of sales tax law in Utah. All 
analysis begins with examining a specific transaction to first 
determine if it falls within the tax imposition language of § 59-
12-103 and then, if taxable under that section, whether it is 
specifically exempted from taxation under § 59-12-104. It is 
uncontested that all items listed in the Audit Summary are 
taxable and that the amounts calculated are correct (Tr. at 11-
12, 85-86, 88, 101-104, 109-112). Additionally, no information 
was provided to contest that all audit items were not accounted 
for, nor tax paid, by any other entity (Tr. at 90-91). 
The transactions for which Petitioner sought refund were 
purchases of either goods consumed by the Petitioner, or for 
tangible personal property which was converted by Petitioner into 
real property (R. at 6-11), (Tr. at 78-79, 91, 97, 100-101). 
Tax was properly imposed on those transactions, and the 
Petitioner's request for refund was properly denied. 
Invalid exemption certificates were supplied by the 
Petitioner for purchases it made on tangible personal property 
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later converted to real property by Petitioner (R. at 211-221), 
(Tr. at 101, 103). 
The Utah Supreme Court has established the purpose of proper 
tax collection administration in administering the Sales Tax Act 
as follows: 
For the purpose of the proper administration of this 
chapter and to prevent evasion of the tax and the duty 
to collect the tax, it shall be presumed that tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item or service 
under subsection 59-12-103(1), sold by any person for 
delivery in this state is sold for storage, use, or 
other consumption in this state unless the person * 
selling such property, item, or service has taken from 
the purchaser an exemption certificate signed by and 
bearing the name and address of the purchaser to the 
effect that the property, item, or service, was 
exempted under § 59-12-104. The exemption certificates 
shall contain information as prescribed by the 
commission. (Emphasis added.) 
Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 717 
(Utah 1990) . The transactions identified in the Audit Summary 
were taxable but for Yeargin's supplying exemption certificates 
for the purchases it made. (Tr. at 100, 103), (R. at 211, 216). 
Regardless of Petitioner's arguments that it consummated the 
purchases in the audit as agent for WECCO as the principal, or 
for itself, tax liability still attaches to the Petitioner. Tax 
was due at the time of the purchase of each item in the audit. 
The Petitioner, if not a real property contractor, was a vendor 
required to collect and remit the tax at the time of each 
transaction. 
"The burden of providing that a sale is for resale or 
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otherwise exempt is upon the person who makes the sale. 
If any agent of the Tax Division requests the vendor to 
produce a valid exemption certificate or other similar 
acceptable evidence to support the vendor's claim that 
a sale is for resale or otherwise exempt, and the 
vendor is unable to comply, the sale will be considered 
taxable and the tax shall be payable by the vendor. 
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-23.E. (Supp. 1996). 
Referencing that rule, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The 
purpose for the statutory requirement that merchants keep records" 
of their sales and exemptions is to prevent tax evasion and tax 
fraud. In the instant case, the Tax Commission properly 
determined that where Tummurru could not uphold its burden of 
proving that the sales were made in interstate commerce or for 
resale by providing records of exemption certificates, the sales 
tax would be levied. Tummurrufs failure to keep records 
necessarily requires this result because oral testimony is not an 
adequate substitute for accurate record keeping." (Emphasis 
added.) Tummurru Trades, 802 P.2d at 718. 
Here, the Petitioner was the presenter of exemption 
certificates. Therefore, in light of the invalidity of the 
exemption certificates, Petitioner is absolutely liable for the 
sales tax that was due and owing. But for the presentation of 
improper exemption certificates, no audit, hearing, or appeal 
would have occurred. The vendor would have collected the tax at 
the time of the transaction in the absence of an exemption 
certificate. 
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If, indeed, the Petitioner made these purchases as an agent 
for an undisclosed principal, it still cannot escape tax 
liability. It may have a cause of action to be indemnified for 
that cost by the principal. It is a fact that Yeargin was the 
purchaser, regardless of whether title passed thereafter to the 
another (R. at 10-11). The entire argument about the capacity of 
the Petitioner as an agent is a red herring. Even if accepted, 
which is not admitted here, such argument does not relieve the 
Petitioner of its tax liability because it became a vendor of 
tangible personal property in the string of transactions. 
If, as Petitioner argues, it received title to the tangible 
personal property from these transactions, and then transferred 
title to WECCO as the ultimate consumer, it would now be liable 
to collect and remit the tax as a vendor pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-107: 
(2)(a) Each vendor shall collect the sales or use tax 
from the purchaser. 
None of the transactions referenced in the audit were allocated 
to any other entity (Tr. at 90-91, 98-99, 111). Additionally, 
purchases subject to a valid exemption were already credited and 
excluded from the audit prior to the statutory notice (Tr. at 86-
87, 89). The unmistakable conclusion from this line of reasoning 
is that even if Petitioner's arguments as to its agency capacity 
were adopted by this Court, the Petitioner was still the 
purchaser of the items (as found by the Tax Commission and 
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substantially proven by the evidence in the Record). Regardless 
of whether Petitioner is a real property contractor or an agent 
for the owner, it cannot escape sales tax liability. 
C. In the Last Alternative, Petitioner is Liable for 
Use Taxes Assessed to a User or Consumer Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(3). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(3) states: 
Each person storing, using, or consuming tangible 
personal property under subsection 59-12-103(1) is 
liable for the use tax imposed under this chapter. 
The Petitioner received tangible personal property purchased in 
transactions identified in the audit (R. at 10-11, T at 88-89, 
101-104, 109-112). Petitioner then either installed or consumed 
the property so purchased (R. at 10-11). Thus, the last person 
to store, use or consume the tangible personal property before it 
was converted to real property was the Petitioner. For all items 
included in Schedule 1 accompanying the Audit Summary, Petitioner 
is liable for use tax since it used those goods. This Court has 
held, "If a vendor doing business in Utah meets any of the above 
conditions, it must collect and remit sales and use taxes. Id. 
If the vendor does not meet any of the conditions, the ^person 
storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property is 
responsible for remitting the use tax.' Id. 59-12-107 (1) (b)." 
B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1164 (Utah App. 
1997), referencing Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 
P.2d 344 (Utah 1996). By delivering exemption certificates to 
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(1975); Johnson v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 
272 P. id 171 (1954); Guard v. County of Maricopa, 14 Ariz. App. 
187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971); Hiabv v. Hiabv, Colo. App., 538 P.2d 
493 (1975); Thompson v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 55, P.2d 1071 
(1977) [sic] ." First of Denver Mtcr. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & 
AS/ 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979). 
Petitioner in its Brief, pages 25-26, implies that a court 
is required to render judgment consistent with the terms of a 
stipulation. Hialev v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). 
The quotation cited is simply a summary of that plaintiff's 
position indicating that the rule precludes the adoption of 
findings in conflict with the stipulated facts. In the next 
paragraph, the court states: 
While Plaintiff accurately cites the rules in this 
regard, we do not adopt his characterization of the 
stipulation. According to the record, the extent to 
which the parties stipulated respecting the deed survey 
was that it could be admitted into evidence and that it 
depicts the ^approximate' location of defendant's 
mobile home. We cannot agree that the effect of this 
stipulation was to bind or obligate the trial court to 
apply the measurements and calculations on the deed the 
survey in determining the location of the disputed 
boundary. (Emphasis added.) 
The general provision of the principal espoused in First of 
Denver continues to be the legal precedent. 
Notwithstanding the legal arguments, the Tax Commission, 
being well aware of the provisions of the Joint Stipulation of 
Facts, acknowledged the same in its Final Decision, and clearly 
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articulated the greater weight of evidence produced which 
contradicted Petitioner's interpretation, and found it necessary 
to sustain and affirm the audit. This Court should not find 
justifiable cause to reverse that decision regarding the 
stipulation. 
Petitioner, in its Brief at page 35, appears to mis-
characterize another Utah Supreme Court decision. Petitioner 
states, "A party may withdraw from a stipulation only on a motion 
to the court. Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d at 171." (Emphasis added.) 
However, the Dove decision appears to the Respondent to reinforce 
the First of Denver decision and does not hold that in the 
absence of a motion to the court the court must follow the 
stipulation. Justice Durham stated in the Dove decision: 
We have previously stated that "[plarties are bound by 
their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the 
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation 
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel and 
Associates, Utah, 600 P.2d 521 (1979) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). It is unlikely that a 
stipulation signed by the counsel and filed with the 
court was entered into inadvertently. Further, 
although the trial court has certain discretion in 
providing relief from a stipulation, if timely 
requested, See Klein v. Klein, Utah, 544 P.2d 472, 476 
(1975), "[ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations 
between parties." Zundel, 600 P.3d at 527 (citations 
omitted). In this case, there is no indication that 
the trial court found as a matter of fact that 
plaintiff did not understand or agree to the 
stipulation; nor did the trial court ground its 
decision to permit withdrawal of the stipulation on any 
legal or equitable basis. Klein, 544 P.2d at 476. In 
the absence of any articulated "justifiable cause," 
Zundel, 600 P.2d at 527, we must reverse the withdrawal 
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of the stipulation. (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
This Court should find that there was justifiable cause, and 
that it was within the discretion of the Tax Commission in light 
of its evidentiary findings, to not rely on a contradictory 
statement within the Joint Stipulation of Facts. 
B. The Evidentiary Burden of Proof Was the 
Petitioner's, and it Failed to Meet That Burden or 
to Shift it to Respondent. 
Utah Code Admin. P. R861-1A-7.G. (Supp. 1996) states, 
"Burden of Proof. The Petitioning party shall have the burden of 
proof to establish that his petition should be granted." The 
Utah Supreme Court also held in Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992), "Because a party appealing from an 
order of an administrative agency must demonstrate that the 
agency's factual determinations are not supported by substantial 
evidence, (citation omitted) we state the facts and all 
legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the agency's findings." 
Petitioner attempts in its brief, specifically pages 11, 15 
and 24, to shift the evidentiary burden to the Respondent. In 
light of the Petitioner's burden of proving that it's Petition 
should be granted, it was obligated to prove by sufficient 
evidence that the audit findings in the statutory notice were 
incorrect. At best, it's reliance on one paragraph of the Joint 
Stipulation of Facts is the only hook upon which its argument can 
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hang. 
On the contrary, the testimony of Ron Jacobsen, witness for 
the Auditing Division, is uncontested in the Record. For each 
item listed on the schedules, Mr. Jacobsen had a purchase order 
from Yeargin, a check from Yeargin, and n^ver a WECCO check (Tr. 
at 111). Also, Mr. Jacobsen testified that he did a 100% review 
of every purchase order and that none of the invoices that were 
part of the assessment against Yeargin were in fact issued by 
PEPCON (or WECCO) (Tr. at 112).l 
Other than raising doubt of that testimony in its Brief 
before this Court, that testimony is uncontroverted. 
Additionally, the testimony of Petitioner's witnesses failed to 
substantiate the same kind of review on and/or repudiate the 
individual entries in the schedules to the Audit Summary. 
The Record reflects that even if the burden of proof had 
successfully shifted from the Petitioner to the Respondent, 
substantial evidence was presented by Respondent, and 
insufficiently contradicted by Petitioner. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission correctly found that the actions of the 
1
 Mr. Jacobsen testified that files pertaining to purchase 
orders covered a range in numeration, "purchase orders stated 
with 1000 and went through 13000-something,..." (Tr. at 88.) He 
did not allege he previewed 12,000 documents. It was clear 
taking his testimony as a whole that he reviewed each applicable 
documents. At a minimum, all entries on the schedules had all 
supporting documents. (See Statement of Facts). 
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Petitioner determined the taxability of purchases, not a written 
agreement. How Yeargin was reimbursed for its taxable purchases 
is immaterial as well. Yeargin, Inc., in the capacity as real 
property contractor, vendor, or consumer, was responsible for tax 
liability as established in the assessment. Sufficient cause 
existed both in legal and factual bases to practically disregard 
a deficient section of the Stipulation of Facts. 
Since the Petitioner has not met either its trial or 
appellate burden of proof justifying a reversal, the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the Tax 
Commission should be sustained in its entirety. 
Dated this ft? day of November, 1998. 
Gale Iv Francis/^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
YEARGIN INC & WESTERN 
ELECTRO CKEMICAL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW# 
) AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
) Aopeal No. 93-0002 
)un: No. H02516 
Respondent. Tax Tvoe: Sales & Use Tax 
STATEMENT ,CTT 
mis matter came ce: <^CL±± O L c t t e Tax Corrimiss: 
a Formal Hearing on March 13, 1997. 3. Blaine Davis, Administrative 
law Judge, heard the matter for and on behalf of the Commission. 
no resent m a retitioner were Mr. Ro.ce rt re: 
the law firm of Giauque Crockett r±endmaer and Peterson, together 
with Mr. Bill Burke and Mr. C. Keith Rooker. present 
representing Respondent were Mr. Gale Francis, Assistant Attorney 
General, together with Mr. Brad Simpson, Mr. Bert Ashcrcft, Mr. Ron 
Jaccbscn, and Ms. Marie Humphreys from the Auditing Division. 
zasa: :ne eviaence a: .imonv oresentea 
nearmg, one Tax Commission nereoy maKes its: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is October 1988 through 
December 198 9. 
3. Petitioner, Yeargin Inc., is a corporation organized, 
existing, and m good standing under the laws of the State of 
Delaware, and was duly qualified to transact business and was in 
good standina as a foreian corporation under the laws of the State 
Western Electrochemical Ccmoanv (WEC w a b a. — o ^  ci 
^eiaware ^orocraticn ana was autnorizea to transact cusmess 
C u O L t 
5. WECCO is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pacific 
Engineering and Production Company of Nevada PEPCCN; which, prior 
to May 4, 1988, operated an ammonium perchlorate (AP) manufacturing 
facility in Clark County, Nevada. Prior to May 4, 1988, PEPCCN was 
one of two domestic producers cf AP. AP is a chemical that is 
essential to a variety of national defense and space exploration 
"crcorams. 
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6. On May 4, 1988, a series of fires and explosions at 
the PEFCON-AP manufacturing facility resulted in the total 
destruction of PEPCON's facility and the loss of approximately one-
half of the United States' domestic AP production capacity. 
7. After the May 4, 1988 fires and explosions, the 
united states ^eoartment or Teiense . DCD, ano tne ^aticna^ 
Aeronautic7s and Space Administration (NASA) determined that it was 
essential to national security and space exploration that the 
nation's AP production capacity be replaced as soon as possible. 
8. After the fires and explosion of May 4, 1988, PEPCCN 
lacked sufficient funds with which to rebuild or replace its A? 
manufacturing facility, and was unable to obtain conventional 
financing for this purpose. In order to expedite tne replenishment 
of the nation's AP production capacity, contractors of NASA and DOD 
made certain financing available to PEPCON Production Inc. (PPI), 
an affiliate of PEPCCN. The terms of the financing prohibited the 
expenditure of the loan funds to purchase unon-severable" property, 
or real property. 
9. The financing made available by contractors of NASA 
- 3 -
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and the DOD was the sole source of construction funds for the AP 
facility until permanent financing was obtained in March, 198Q. 
10. It was not possible to rebuild the AP manufacturing 
facility on the site that had been occupied by the PEPCON 
manufacturing facility. After a brief but intensive search, a 
suicacle site was located m Iron County, Utah, approximately 15 
miles west of Cedar City. PPI purchased the site with its own 
funds because real property was not a permissible use of tne 
construction funds. Construction began at the Iron County site m 
July, 1988 and proceeded under the terms of a 2CD cricnty rating, 
pursuant to the provisions of the Cefense Priority and Allocation 
System Regulation 15 C.F.R. 251 . 
11. Curing tne construction period, a search for 
permanent financing continued. When construction was nearly 
complete, permanent financing was obtained from Security Pacific 
Bank, Washington, N.A. The permanent financing was closed on Marcn 
5, 1989. On that date, the lender required that PEPCON form WECCC 
for the purpose of completing the construction of the facility and 
thereafter operating the facility. WECCO then succeeded PPI as tne 
<fOUOi>038 
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owner of the AF facility under construction. Initial manufacture 
of AP at the new WECCO-AP manufacturing facility occurred in 
August, 1989. 
12. During the course of construction of the facility, 
?PI and WECCC entered into an agreement with United Engineers and 
Constructors, Inc., and its affiliate, Yeargm, for purpose of 
providing assistance m the engineering, design and procurement for 
the construct ion of the AP manufacturing facility. United 
Engineers assisted WECCO in purchasing materials for use m tne 
construction of the facility and located suppliers, obtained price 
quotations and arranged for WECCC to make purchases of materials. 
In addition to assisting WECCC, United Engineers and Yeargm 
actually purchased some of the materials wnich were invoiced and 
billed to Yeargm and were paid for by checks from Yeargm. 
Yeargm ultimately installed those materials into the real property 
at the WECCO facility or consumed the materials in the construction 
process. The contract provides that title to all materials 
purchased for use at the WECCO facility would pass directly from 
suppliers to WECCC, out the invoices and checks indicate mat some 
- 5-
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of tne materials came to rest m tne nands of Yeargin. 
13 . United Engineers placed one of its employees with 
Yeargin to perform the purcnasmg function for the products for 
WECCO. That employee performed those purchasing functions. 
Paragraph 3C-17 of tne Agreement oetween PPI and United Engineers 
ana Constructors Inc. , provided tnat "title to all material ana 
eq^ip^ent procured cy contractor to ce incorporated into tne 
prefect, snail pass to owner ^pen delivery to common carrier or at 
tne project site, wnicnever is provided for m tne purchase order." 
However, Petitioner was not a party to tnat contract. Ever, if 
Petitioner nad oeen a party to tne contract, tne actions cf 
Petitioner determine tne taxability of purchases, and not the 
written agreement, especially if tne provisions of tne agreement 
/vere net followea. 
14. Notwithstanding paragraph GC-1"7 of the agreement, 
paragraph A-l of the agreement provides tne contractor United or 
Yeargin is to "procure, deliver and install permanent materials 
ana equipment;". The evidence submitted m this proceeding is 
clear tnat Petitioner did procure manv cf tne materials and install 
0Glk,'01 
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them into the project. 
15. Yeargin also issued an exemption certificate to the 
vendors of some of the materials. Exemption certificates were not 
appropriately issued for any materials which were not resold or 
which Petitioner installed into real property. 
16. There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that 
V1ECC0 or any ether company paid the sales tax on the materials at 
issue in this proceeding. 
17. The only items en which sales tax has been imposed 
uoon Petitioner by Respondent are those materials which were 
invoiced to Petitioner and/or were paid for by checks of 
Petitioner. 
13. In performing the audit, Respondent looked only at 
who bought and paid for the materials. The source of those funds 
was not, and should not have been, material in determining whether 
or not Petitioner should have paid sales tax Gn the materials. 
19. Petitioner converted the materials to real property, 
or personally consumed the materials in the construction of the 
cro-^ ect . 
-7-
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APPLICABLE LAW 
There is a sales tax imposed upon the purchaser for 
amounts paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal 
property made within the State of Utah rj.C.A. 59-12-103). 
Property purchased for resale in this state m the 
regular course of business, either m its original form or as an 
ingredient or component part of a manufactured or compounded 
product is exempt from sales tax. U.C.A. 59-12 - 104 (27) • 
Sales cf construction materials and other items of 
tangible personal property to real property contractors and 
repairmen of real property are subject to tax if the contractor cr 
repairman converts the materials cr items to real property. Rule 
R865-19S-53, Utan Administrative Code;. 
The contractor or repairman who converts the personal 
property to real property is the consumer of tangible personal 
property regardless of the type cf contract entered into between 
the parties. (Rule R865-19S-583.1, Utah Administrative Code). 
ANALYSIS 
In this case, Respondent made an audit assessment against 
-8-
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Petitioner for additional sales and use taxes. Petitioner has paid 
the full amount of sales and use taxes, together with the interest 
thereon, and Petitioner is now seeking a refund of approximately 
$87,000 for the taxes and interest which it paid pursuant to the 
audit. If the audit assessment is correct, then Petitioner was not 
entitled to such a refund. If the audit assessment was not 
correct, then Petitioner is entitled tc a refund. 
The position cf Petitioner is that it never made any 
purchases cf products upon which it should have paid tax, because 
the title tc those products passed directly to WECCO as provided by 
the contract between WECCO, PEPCCN Production Inc., and United 
Engineers and Constructors, Inc. 
Petitioner furtner relies upon paragraph 12 cf tne 
stipulation cf facts entered into between the parties in which it 
was agreed that United Engineers assisted WECCO in purchasing 
materials for use in the construction of the facility and located 
suppliers, obtained price quotations and arranged for WECCO to make 
purchases cf materials. Therefore, Petitioner claims that its only 
function was tc assist in obtaminc materials and that it did not 
j ; i )00b0 i3 
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actually obtain any such materials. However, the interpretation of 
the Commission of that stipulation is that although one of the 
functions of United Engineering was to assist WECCO, that does not 
foreclose the possibility that United Engineers (Yeargin) may have 
itself purchased materials for the construction of the facility. 
The Petitioner's interpretation of paragraph 12 is one possible 
interpretation of the paragraph, but it is not the only possible 
interpretation. Further, Respondent has submitted evidence which 
would indicate that Petitioner's interpretation of paragraph 12 
does not accurately portray the facts as they were carried out by 
the parties. 
Petitioner also takes the position that everything was 
purchased for the account of the owner, but there may have been 
seme mistakes in documentation because of the fast-track 
requirements to try to get the plant built in a hurry to restore 
the nation's AP production capacity. Again, that does not comport 
with the invoices billing items directly to Yeargin, and Yeargin 
then paying those invoices from its funds. That argument may be 
persuasive if it were determined that the owner, either WECCC cr 
-10-
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PEPCCN paid the tax on the materials, but there is no evidence to 
indicate that any other entity has also paid the tax on the 
materials purchased by Yeargin. 
Therefore, it appears clear to the Commission that 
Yeargin purchased the materials and installed those materials into 
the real property at the Cedar City facility cr otherwise consumed 
those materials or supplies m the construction of that project. 
Under either event, sales and use tax would be due and owing from 
Petitioner. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the audit assessment made by Respondent was appropriate, that 
Petitioner was responsible for the payment of such sales and use 
taxes. Petitioner is therefore net entitled to the requested 
refund. The request for refund is denied, and the audit assessment 
0001,015 
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is affirmed and sustained. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 'V day of /V r \wV , 1997. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order 
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you 
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you 
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a.) 
a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b. ) a 
Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo m district court. 
(Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-
601(1), 63-46b-13 et. sea.) 
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